Inquiry into the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Bill 2006 and the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006
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Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee
November 2006
Office of the Privacy Commissioner
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (the Office) is an independent
statutory body responsible for promoting an Australian culture that respects
privacy. The Office, established under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ('the Privacy
Act'), has responsibilities for the protection of individuals' personal
information that is handled by Australian and ACT government agencies, and
personal information held by all large private sector organisations, health
service providers and some small businesses. The Office also has
responsibilities under the Privacy Act in relation to credit worthiness
information held by credit reporting agencies and credit providers, and personal
tax file numbers used by individuals and organisations.
Background
The Office welcomes the opportunity to make this submission to the Senate
Legal and Constitutional Committee's Inquiry into the Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorism Financing Bill 2006 ('the Bill') and the Anti-Money Laundering
and Counter-Terrorism Financing (Transitional Provisions and Consequential
Amendments) Bill 2006 ('the Consequential Amendments Bill').
The Office previously provided submissions on the first exposure draft to the
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee inquiry ('the Senate Inquiry') in
March 2006, and to the Attorney General's Department ('the Department') in April
2006.1 The Office also provided evidence at the
public hearings for the Senate Inquiry. Additionally, the Office made a
submission the Department's consultation on the second exposure draft in August
2006.2
While recognising the advantages of measures to address money-laundering and
terrorism financing, the Office reiterates that such measures should be
proportionate to the serious offences they are aimed at in order to warrant the
collection of a significant quantity of personal information including sensitive
financial information. The Office notes that the current reform will
significantly expand the regulatory regime, and in turn the amount of personal
information collected, use and disclosed. This will be further extended when the
second tranche of reporting entities is introduced.
In this regard, the Office notes the view offered by of the Senate Legal and
Constitutional Committee in its 1993 Inquiry into financial transactions. In
noting that "…FTR Information is particularly sensitive and intrusive…", the
Committee concluded that:
"AUSTRAC was established to respond to major crime, not lesser breaches of
the law such as more minor breaches of the Social Security Act…AUSTRAC was
established to enable law enforcement agencies to strike at major crime and that
is what it should continue to do.3"
The Office submits that, in absence of a clear and compelling alternate view,
this underpinning policy setting remains appropriate.
This submission provides comment on a significant and positive change since
the last exposure draft, outlines how the Office will engage with the process if
the Bill is passed and reiterates the three main areas of continuing concern.
Privacy regulation for small businesses
The Office welcomes the provision made in section 152 of the Consequential
Amendments Bill to apply the Privacy Act to those activities of small business
operators that are undertaken for the purpose of compliance with the Bill, or
regulations or rules made under the Bill.
This is one of the recommendations that the Office has been making during the
course of the consultations and believes that this provision will assist in
ensuring that personal information will be appropriately collected and managed
by small businesses for the purposes of the Bill.
Office engagement
The Office also welcomes the commitment outlined in the second reading speech
accompanying the Bill for the Office to receive additional funding of $1.8
million over 4 years to provide guidance and assistance to small business
operators to meet their obligations under the Privacy Act. 4
The Office will use this additional funding in three main areas:
- to develop guidance material and conduct educational activities with small
business operators who will be brought under the Privacy Act for the purposes of
the AML/CTF legislation, including the production of multi-lingual guidelines
and fact sheets;
- to provide advice to the Attorney General's Department and other Australian
Government agencies in relation to privacy issues relating to the implementation
of the scheme, including the second tranche legislation, and to provide advice
in response to the mandatory consultation requirement on AUSTRAC (section
212(2)(a)(vi)); and
- to conduct a regular audit program of Australian Government agencies
handling personal information collected as part of the AML/CTF
requirements.
Access to AUSTRAC information by 'designated agencies'
The Bill (at section 5) includes 24 subsections to the definition of
'designated agency', and three subsections providing mechanisms to add further
designated agencies by regulation. These agencies would be permitted to have
direct access to AUSTRAC information, which has been collected for purposes
relating to the prevention of money-laundering and terrorism funding. The Office
has previously stated that given its importance the deliberative process for
adding additional designated agencies should be separate from the current major
reform program
The Office notes that the new agencies added to the definition are the
Immigration Department, the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security and
the Treasury Department. 5
The Office also notes that currently 2,700 individuals are authorised to have
online access to AUSTRAC's database, with more than half of these individuals in
the Australian Taxation Office.6
The Office has previously argued that, consistent with good privacy practice,
individual's personal information collected for the purpose of enforcing serious
crime, such as money laundering and terrorism financing, should generally only
be used for such purposes. Collecting and sharing personal financial information
for matters of lesser gravity than AML/CTF and other similarly major crime may
not align with community expectations concerning how this information should be
handled. The Office reiterates its previous view that the access to personal
information held by AUSTRAC should be narrowly restricted to those agencies and
other bodies that require such information as a necessary part of responding to
major crimes.
While the Office's preference is for agencies to be nominated in the primary
legislation if the process is to be undertaken through regulation the Office
suggests that wide consultation be undertaken before an agency is added.
Access to AUSTRAC information by state and territory agencies
An important factor in ensuring appropriate privacy protections to
individuals' personal information is the consistency of protections afforded by
all organisations and agencies that will handle the information. In that light,
the proposed scheme does not appear to have consistent privacy protections for
AUSTRAC information once it has been accessed and collected by State and
Territory agencies. Not all state and territory Parliaments have enacted privacy
legislation covering their own agencies, and of those jurisdictions that have
enacted legislation, there is not uniformity in either the protections or the
remedies available.
Access to AUSTRAC data by State and Territory agencies, as set out in the
Bill, appears to largely reflect current practice. Section 126(3) requires
AUSTRAC to obtain an undertaking from state and territory agencies that the
information will be dealt with in accordance with the Information Privacy
Principles (IPPs). While this is intended to impose obligations on those state
and territory agencies accessing personal information held by AUSTRAC, it is not
clear whether this process allows individuals to make complaints and to seek
remedies if they consider that their information has been dealt with
inappropriately by one of those agencies. Given the expansion in the scope of
the financial transactions reporting regime indicated by the Bill, the Office
considers that it is important to strengthen the privacy protections which apply
to the information once it has left the control of AUSTRAC, particularly where
the receiving agency may not be subject to any privacy regulation.
In its submission on the first exposure draft, April 2006, the Office offered
two suggestions as to how this may be resolved. These suggestions were outlined
at paragraphs 45-47 of that submission:7
" 45. The Office notes that one option may be to introduce a provision
into the Privacy Act similar to sections 17 and 18 concerning the handling of
tax file numbers (TFNs). In précis, s.17 requires the Privacy Commissioner to
make statutory guidelines for the handling of TFNs, while s.18 makes it an
offence for a 'file number recipient' to breach these guidelines. In turn, s.13
prescribes that a breach of s.17 is an "interference with privacy", in regard to
which an individual may, under s.36(1) complain to the Privacy Commissioner.
Significantly, 'tax file number recipients', about which individuals may
complain, may include state and territory bodies that are not covered by the
IPPs. 46. Accordingly, it can be seen that the arrangements for TFN
regulation provide uniform rules to any class of recipient, as well as the
opportunity for an individual to seek redress to the Privacy
Commissioner. 47. An alternative model is provided in the arrangements for
privacy regulation of contract service providers (CSPs) to Commonwealth
agencies. While the nature of the interactions are different to those that occur
between AUSTRAC and state and territory bodies, the interplay between s.95B and
s.13A(c) establishes a mechanism by which:
- contract service providers must comply with the IPPs and
- individuals are able to complain to the Privacy Commissioner under the IPPs
for a breach allegedly committed by a CSP.
The transaction value threshold
$10,000 threshold
A key mechanism for reducing privacy risks is to limit the collection of
personal information to that which is necessary and proportionate to achieve a
given objective.
The Office notes that the number of significant cash transaction reports has
increased approximately 200% since 1991. In 2005-06, the number of reported
significant cash transactions was 2,416,427. 8
The prescribed significant cash transaction threshold has remained constant
at $10,000 since the scheme was introduced and, as a consequence of price
inflation, the reporting scheme will increasingly capture personal information
regarding transactions that may not have been anticipated when the legislation
was first drafted. In November 1993, the Senate Legal and Constitutional
Committee released its report "Checking the Cash", a review on the operation of
the FTR Act. Recommendation 2 addressed the threshold amount. It said:
"The Committee recommends that the reporting threshold for significant cash
transaction reports should not be allowed to erode significantly through
inflation. To achieve this, the threshold should be adjusted periodically after
consultation with cash dealers. The aim of the adjustment should be to maintain
the threshold at, or near, the present amount in real terms."
There has been no adjustment to the threshold in the 18 years since the FTR
Act was introduced. In the Office's view, the current process of regulatory
reform provides an opportunity for this threshold to be revised upward. As
organisations will already been undergoing changes to their compliance processes
and systems to accommodate the proposed regulatory reform, it seems opportune to
amend this threshold amount to a more appropriate figure. Once organisations
have completed the process of establishing processes to meet the new regulatory
arrangements, they may be highly reluctant to support a change in the threshold
amount in the foreseeable future.
It is therefore an appropriate time to reconsider the threshold. Retention of
the existing threshold will naturally result in more reports to AUSTRAC as
inflation erodes the purchasing power of $10,000.
1 Submission to the Attorney-General's Department for its
consultation on the 1st exposure draft, April 2006: http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/antimoneysub010506.pdf. Submission
to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee Inquiry in to the 1st exposure
draft, March 2006: http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/amlsub.pdf. 2 Submission to the Attorney-General's Department for its
consultation on the 2nd exposure draft, August 2006: http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/sub_aml_ctfb_200608.pdf. 3 Checking the Cash: A Report on the Effectiveness of the Financial
Transaction Reports Act 1988, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs, November 1993, section 8.15. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/pre1996/ftr_cash/index.htm 4 The Hon Philip Ruddock MP Attorney-General, 1 November 2006 House
of Representatives Hansard, p.1 [available at http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/TranslateWIPILink.aspx?Folder=HANSARDR&Criteria=DOC_DATE:2006-11-01%3BSEQ_NUM:6%3B]. 5 It is noted that access by the Treasury Department is limited to
Division of Treasury responsible for the administration of the Foreign Takeovers
and Acquisitions Act 1975. 6 AUSTRAC Annual Report 2005-06 p.
43. 7 Available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications /antimoneysub010506.html#mozTocId80183. 8 AUSTRAC Annual report 2005-06 Fact Sheet [available at http://www.austrac.gov.au/publications /annualreports/200506/pdf/austrac_annual_report_fact_sheet_2005_06.pdf].
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